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Abstract The agencies of the government of the United States of America, such as 
the Food and Drug Administration or the Environmental Protection Agency, inter-
vene in American society through the collection, processing, and diffusion of infor-
mation. The Presidency of Barack Obama was notable for updating and redesigning 
the US government’s information infrastructure. The White House enhanced mass 
consultation through open government and big data initiatives to evaluate policy 
effectiveness, and it launched new ways of communicating with the citizenry. In this 
essay we argue that these programs spelled out an emergent epistemology based on 
two assumptions: dispersed knowledge and a critique of judgment. These programs 
have redefined the evidence required to justify and design regulatory policy and con-
ferred authority to a new kind of expert, which we call epistemic consultants.
Keywords Expertise · Governance · Big data · Open government · Dispersed 
knowledge · Behavioral economics
The central claim of this essay is that the administration of Barack Obama adopted 
a picture of knowledge that disempowered experiential forms of expertise and 
endorsed what we call epistemic consultants. Claims to expertise may be ground on 
detailed knowledge and experience within domains of practice and policy, like pub-
lic health or education. During the Obama administration, a set of initiatives were 
enacted that downgraded the authority of these actors in favor of social scientists 
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without any attachment to a specific experiential/policy domain, but with skills that 
applied across government. In the place of the testimony of domain-specific experts, 
the design of public policy favored reliance upon data aggregation, pattern matching 
algorithms, behavioral experiments, and simulated and actual randomized control 
trials. We believe that comparable developments have taken place in other Western 
nations and deserve close scrutiny.
One of science studies most arresting claims is that nations exhibit cultures of 
rationality, or in the apt formulation of Sheila Jasanoff: “‘public knowledge ways,’ 
that comprise preferred modes of producing public knowledge and conducting 
policy deliberation” (Jasanoff 2012: 9). In this essay we argue that the picture of 
knowledge that emerged during the Obama administration prescribed certain knowl-
edge ways, and we show by what institutional mechanisms, agencies, and actors 
these were implemented in the government of the United States of America. Sci-
ence studies has tended to view national epistemic cultures as resilient and has 
richly described them in case studies of how risks are managed and futures imagined 
(Ballo 2015; Bouzarovski and Bassin 2011; Felt 2014; Fonseca and Pereira 2014; 
Jasanoff and Kim 2009; Jasanoff and Kim 2015; Kim 2014; Levenda et  al. 2019; 
Tidwell and Smith 2015). These studies reveal the American civic epistemology 
to be “contentious” (Jasanoff 2007: chapter 10) when compared to its counterpart 
in France, UK, Germany, or the European Union. Our account complements these 
claims by showing how the character of public reason may be studied beyond the 
contrast between national polities (and the complex of government, courts, acade-
mies, and civil society) by looking at institutional change. But it also highlights how 
public knowledge ways can undergo rapid change. We draw our focus onto the rede-
sign of the information infrastructure of the US government. We pay close atten-
tion to what these designs tell us about the Obama administration’s epistemic prefer-
ences, that while not transforming the American “contentious” civic epistemology 
did reconfigure who wielded power and control.
At the same time as science studies scholars document national variability 
in pathways to knowledge, they have also worried about the simplistic models of 
expert authority found in campaign materials of learned societies, such as the Royal 
Society of the United Kingdom or the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science. As organized science sets out to claim a monopoly of authority, science 
studies scholars counter it with pleas for public engagement and for extending our 
definition of expertise (Collins and Evans 2002 famously set this as the problem 
for contemporary sociology of science.) Our essay shows that the Obama admin-
istration’s implicit answer to the question “who is the expert?” matches neither the 
ambitions of scientist advocacy groups nor the counsel of its sociological critics. We 
contend that the US government came to rely on psychological and economic theo-
ries of knowledge to decide on what experts to trust.
The major initiatives we discuss in this essay were presented to the citizenry as 
fostering open and smart government. These initiatives changed the types of evi-
dence that government departments and agencies were required to collect and act 
upon, both in what to consider when marking the decision to intervene (upstream) 
and in how to communicate with the citizenry (downstream). Although not explicitly 
codified, we hypothesize that Obama’s information reformers shared two epistemic 
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assumptions. (i) The kind of information most relevant for assessing, creating, and 
enacting policy is dispersed throughout the population; it is everywhere and in eve-
ryone and requires special techniques and tools to be revealed. (ii) Human judgment 
is unreliable; individuals frequently make errors and exhibit biases so their judgment 
and reasoning should be considered with caution.
The initiatives inspired by this epistemology emerged in the course of the Obama 
administration. They did not come pre-formed, rather they were the incremental and 
idiosyncratic achievement of agencies and actors in collaboration, working from 
within an institutional culture. It is for this reason that we must pay special atten-
tion to a few key institutions that wielded the power to promote information man-
agement reforms during Barack Obama’s first term in office. The primary mover of 
these reforms was the office of the US government charged with oversight of infor-
mation, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (henceforth OIRA). In our 
first section, we briefly review the culture and track record of OIRA. We explain 
how from its creation the agency has acted as an instrument of an administrative 
presidency that compelled agencies to account for their informational practices. 
That vocation and function made it attractive to those seeking to use information 
management to change the knowledge ways of the US government. We then out-
line Obama’s reforms by attending to the two key aspects of the Obama adminis-
tration’s epistemology ((i) and (ii)). In our second section, we focus on dispersed 
knowledge. We document key statements by important actors in the administration, 
notably, Obama’s first-term ‘Regulatory Czar’ and OIRA head, Cass Sunstein, and 
describe  how the idea that knowledged is dispersed throughout society  was used 
to justify open government and big data policy initiatives. In our third section, we 
discuss behavioral economics’ account of judgment. Our argument again examines 
the ideas and statements of key policy entrepreneurs to explain why they promoted 
empirical and behavioral evidence and viewed testimony and deliberation with skep-
ticism. In our last section, we argue that the changes and ideas we document should 
be seen together and that they served to undermine the authority of experience-based 
forms of expertise while promoting the skills of those we call epistemic consultants.
Regulating the Regulators
A feature of contemporary policymaking in the United States is the increasing reli-
ance on mechanisms of administrative control. Through the Office of the Manage-
ment of the Budget (OMB) and its grip on funds, the White House has means to 
constrain and direct regulatory agencies and programs that ought formally to answer 
to Congress. For our purposes the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA), a small subsidiary of the OMB, is of special interest since it exerts con-
trol through a grip on information.1 In this section we review the political context 
1 The primary sources of this study are the annual reports and support documentation issued by OIRA 
and various speeches and letters by its officials, among which Sunstein was the most visible and forceful. 
During the early stages of research for this essay, in 2015, much of this documentation was readily avail-
able online. Since 2016 and the handover to the Trump administration much of it has disappeared. The 
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that brought OIRA into being and how its function within the American government 
propelled it to become an important conduit for informational reforms. We content 
that to a large extent these reforms build upon a pre-existing political and adminis-
trative culture.
OIRA was created by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 with the assignment 
of overhauling federal collections of information from the public. The bipartisan 
bill pledged to de-bureaucratize and improve coordination between agencies, and 
thus ease the burdens of form filling that weighed on families and firms. The benign 
mandate to “cut down the red tape” followed a tradition of Federal Reporting acts 
that went as far back as 1942, however, the bill’s outcomes were almost immediately 
entangled with a distinct and more radical set of concerns, those of deregulation. 
OIRA would not merely simplify the communication between regulatory agencies 
and the public, it would become instrumental in eliminating components of that 
relationship.
By way of an Executive Order (#12291 of February 17, 1981) the then recently 
inaugurated President Ronald Reagan introduced the requirement of cost benefit 
analysis on new federal regulations (Reagan 1981).2 Government agencies were 
required to file “Regulatory Impact Analyses” to the Director of the OMB. OIRA 
was to estimate the cost-benefit appraisals, a role that under Presidents Gerald Ford 
and Jimmy Carter had been informally taken up by the Council of Economic Advis-
ers (DeMuth 2011: 16).3 Advocates for Reagan’s review bottleneck claimed that it 
saved 10 billion dollars annually with an additional 9–11 billion dollars one-time 
savings. From 1981 to 1989 OIRA reviews returned, changed, or withdrew over 30 
rulings from the departments of Health and Human Services, Education, Labor, and 
Housing and Urban Development (Weidenbaum 1997: 23; Miller 2011).4
By the later Reagan years, OIRA directors were under suspicion of consulting 
with business organizations and acting in their interests. In 1986 Congress threat-
ened to drain OIRA’s funding until its analyses were released for public study. The 
White House complied with the demands of Congress and accepted curbs on the 
office’s actions, including subjecting the nomination of directors to Congressional 
confirmation (Harris and Milkis 1996; Morrison 1986). It was under these new 
rules that President George H. W. Bush was prevented from appointing a Director, 
2 According to Murray Weidenbaum (1997), the modern review process of regulation was initiated 
under the Presidency of Richard Nixon. For a slightly longer review, see Tozzi (2011).
3 OIRA’s role was confirmed by executive order #12498 of January 4, 1985, making the OMB the final 
arbiter of the regulatory process (Reagan 1985). Cost-benefit analysis became a decisive test and no 
longer merely consultive.
4 The most controversial single action of Reagan’s OIRA was in its dealings with the Environmental 
Protection Agency. OIRA, deeming market mechanisms as more robust than a ban on emissions, pro-
posed to the EPA a marketable permits program that allowed petroleum firms with less refining capacity 
to purchase credits against lead restriction from those with greater capacity (DeMuth 2011: 19). With 
no executive discretion OIRA was an advocate for the neoliberal proposals that became emblematic of 
Reagan’s administration.
Footnote 1 (continued)
documents we examine herein are public record, we refer to the original in the form we found them and 
as we stored them offline.
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and instead created an adhoc Council on Competitiveness to supervise the Office’s 
actions. During his administration there were few notable changes to OIRA’s func-
tioning, and the Office kept its reputation as an agent of the Republican White 
House’s constraining of the regulatory state.
By contrast, in his first year at the White House Bill Clinton issued an Execu-
tive Order (#12866, September 30 1993) that encouraged regulatory interventions 
(Clinton 1993). Clinton established OIRA as the preeminent bureau for regulatory 
oversight, for planning and to an extent even for the design of rules. He charged 
every agency to appoint a Regulatory Policy Officer to liaise with OIRA, mandated 
every agency to produce a Regulatory Plan for review and compilation, and required 
agencies to self-examine their progress against the plans. The vision was that OIRA 
would centralize expertise on rulemaking; and lay out before all alternative pro-
grams of action and inaction.
During the George W. Bush Presidency allegations of industry capture briefly 
resurfaced, with the press reporting that industry think tanks were liaising with 
OIRA to create “hit lists” for deregulation. But despite these concerns and Bush’s 
record of deregulation being longer than Clinton’s, there was no return to OIRA as 
regulation buster (Eisner et al. 2006; Power and Schlesinger 2002). The regime that 
the Obama administration inherited was, thus, the one remade by the Clinton execu-
tive order and by the rewriting of the Paperwork Reduction Act in May 1995. That 
legislation asserted Presidential control over the independent agencies, and through 
its influence on agencies’ rulemaking extended the discretion of the administration 
(Kagan 2001). Although a small office with few staff, OIRA came to wield “outsize 
power” by coupling its status as regulator of regulators to its stewardship over the 
information policy of the administration (Weisman and Bravin 2009).
Obama and his advisors saw control of rulemaking and information through 
OIRA as a valuable instrument for an administrative presidency. To head the office, 
Obama appointed his former colleague at the University of Chicago Law School, 
Cass Sunstein. Sunstein had long trumpeted information management as a signifi-
cant and underutilized instrument of government (Sunstein 1986, 2005; Sunstein 
et al. 1998). OIRA’s history as information regulator of all other agencies led Sun-
stein to see it as the ideal venue from which to change the government’s culture of 
information and evidence use.5
As we will describe, Sunstein used the ideas that knowledge is dispersed in soci-
ety and that individual judgment is often deficient to justify initiatives aimed at 
opening the government’s store of information and at tailoring policy and commu-
nication as “nudges” to public behavior and the behavior of policy makers. Obama 
reframed OIRA in an executive order that bears the imprint of Sunstein’s vision 
(#13563, January 18 2011), issued just after the Democratic Party lost its majority 
in the House of Representatives, i.e. at a moment when an administrative presidency 
5 Early on in their relationship, Sunstein’s wife—Harvard Political Scientist and ambassador to the UN 
during Obama’s presidency—Samantha Power asked Sunstein if he ever fantasized about doing another 
job. She recalls his response: “I expected him to say he dreamed of playing for the Red Sox…. [Instead,] 
his eyes got real big and he said: ‘Ooh! OIRA!’” (Wallace-Wells 2010).
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became an inevitability. It set out to move OIRA from the juncture of regulatory 
agencies and the White House to being the point of interface between government, 
agencies, the scientific community, and the public and to become the compiler of 
their collective wisdom (Obama 2011). Whilst under Clinton, OIRA would interact 
with agencies behind closed doors and then publicize its decisions and reasoning, 
under Obama OIRA invited the public to contribute to its reviews at an early stage 
and to “comment through the Internet on any proposed regulation.”6
In 1980 OIRA was created to be a gatekeeper that would curtail requests of infor-
mation by agencies and thus relieve the public from government’s surveillance. 
OIRA made its reach felt across the Mall as impediment, imposing cost-benefit reck-
onings on agencies’ actions. In the early 2010s OIRA was reinvented as the gate-
way through which the public would flood the halls of government with comment, 
direction, and insight. Despite a rhetoric of openness, Obama-era OIRA’s gateway 
of consultation and knowledge exchange did not admit entry to all. As we describe 
below, OIRA intruded into rulemaking by imposing to agencies new standards of 
evidence—including retrospective evaluation, experimentation, and data analytics. 
These new standards were justified as privileging a more robust set of knowledge 
ways touted as “data-driven, evidence-based regulation and to select approaches on 
the basis of empirical findings, rather than intuition, anecdote, or guesswork” (OMB 
2010). OIRA’s presentation before the agencies it oversaw was that of an epistemic 
authority, a knowledge overseer.
Dispersed Knowledge
At the time of Obama’s election, media reports and political pundits criticized the 
American government’s lack of regard for science advice. The Union of Concerned 
Scientists had since 2004 waged a campaign against President George W. Bush’s 
“unprecedented” “manipulation, suppression and misrepresentation of science.” (2) 
The Bush administration’s handling of scientific advice created a scandal in June 
2003 when it was revealed that the White House had edited a report by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency on climate change. In its protest the Union of Concerned 
Scientists built a case setting climate change denial alongside censorship of research 
in reproductive health, air quality, and endangered species and listed numerous 
appointments of dubious merit to scientific advisory bodies. “Scientific integrity” 
was in peril because of the choice of unqualified and compromised advisors (Shul-
man 2008; Abraham and Ballinger 2012).
Barack Obama pledged to repair science advice. In a memo of March 9 of 2009, 
two months after his inauguration, he instructed heads of agencies and executive 
departments to maintain “the highest level of integrity in all aspects of the executive 
branch’s involvement with scientific and technological processes” (Obama 2009a). 
6 On May 10, 2012, Obama’s executive order “Identifying and reducing regulatory burdens” commit-
ted the White House to periodic review of regulations together with the “open exchange of information” 
(Obama 2012).
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Strikingly, it took 20 months before procedures implementing “scientific integrity” 
were set in place, including nominating the Union of Concerned Scientists’ scien-
tific integrity officer to scrutinize allegations of tampering with government science. 
These responses suggest that “integrity” and channeling advice from organized sci-
ence was not a high and urgent priority of the administration. A very different kind 
of epistemological attitude drew greater emphasis and it did not, primarily, call upon 
credentialed scientists.
In one of his early speeches as head of OIRA, Sunstein (2010c: 19) explained that 
the administration was trying to “ensure that institutions benefit from the dispersed 
knowledge of Americans.”7 OIRA’s reports to Congress between 2009 and 2015 
regularly repeated the idea that “knowledge is widely dispersed in society” (OIRA 
2009: 39). The President himself adopted that phrase. When remarking that “infor-
mation maintained by the Federal Government is a national asset,” Obama added 
that “[k]nowledge is widely dispersed in society, and public officials benefit from 
having access to that dispersed knowledge” (Obama 2009b).
In some of his speeches as a government official and in most of his earlier publi-
cations, Sunstein explained “dispersed knowledge” by referring to a famous essay of 
1945 by Austrian economist and political philosopher, Friedrich von Hayek, entitled 
“The Use of Knowledge in Society.” Despite similarities, Hayek’s and Sunstein’s 
conceptions of dispersed knowledge differ in some important ways. Hayek was writ-
ing to a debate about the possibilities of planning. To counter the socialist project 
of codifying knowledge and calculating the rational course of action, Hayek argued 
that the knowledge relevant for planning was intrinsically personal and dispersed 
throughout society. According to Hayek, the unstable and sometimes inarticulable 
nature of this knowledge prevented it from being collated by any supra-individual 
entity. Instead the market and the price mechanism, which Hayek believed emerged 
spontaneously and without any higher design, was the best way to set personal 
knowledge in motion and concert. This developed into the neoliberal view that 
market-like structures and prices should be adopted for all social interactions that 
require the coordination of information (Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2017; Mirowski 
and Plewhe 2009).
For Hayek’s purposes the distinction between knowers and non-knowers was not 
salient. The knowledge he was concerned with was knowledge of wants, desires, and 
specific circumstances, which one assumes all individuals possess in some measure. 
Obama, Sunstein, and their collaborators, on the other hand, sought to harvest a dif-
ferent variety of knowledge. As well as wants, desires, and circumstances, govern-
ment agencies need to make use of specialist and technical knowledge. But, because 
such knowledge is asymmetrically apportioned, tapping it requires cunning strate-
gies of elicitation, assembly, and processing. Sunstein’s argument was that adopting 
Hayek’s outlook on economic knowledge would provide appropriate strategies to 
manage this specialist knowledge. The extent to which people trust what they think 
they know was assumed to correlate with the extent to which they are willing to 
7 Sunstein (2010a) explains that “[f]or Hayek, a key problem is how to incorporate that unorganized and 
dispersed knowledge. That problem cannot possibly be solved by any particular person or board.”
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act (or bet) on it. Sunstein’s claim was that the way to harvest the specialist knowl-
edge  he was concerned with is to aggregate people’s actions in a free entry and 
exit environment where knowledge is rewarded  (either monetarily, with influence, 
or by other means), not unlike a market. In the 2006 book Infotopia, Sunstein dis-
cussed wikis and open source software (online collaborations that anyone can con-
tribute to and edit) and prediction markets (where predictions about events are gar-
nered from bets) as examples of market-like processes for aggregating specialist and 
technical knowledge. The idea is that if enough people have access to the source 
code (for software), editable page (for a wiki), or betting counter (for a prediction 
market), then their partial knowledge will combine to debug programs (software), 
correct errors of fact (wiki), or anticipate the future (prediction markets) (Raymond 
2000).8
The handling of these systems of information elicitation and aggregation do not 
typically require specialist knowledge of the issues under consideration. However, 
they do require management and oversight by a specific kind of actor that is familiar 
with the digital platforms and knows how to design information architectures that 
encourage participation. Unlike Hayek’s markets there is not the assumption of a 
spontaneous order.
Several flagship initiatives of the Obama Presidency were conceived as exercises 
in knowledge aggregation. One of Obama’s first actions as President was to release 
a memorandum on Transparency and Open Government.9 Open government was 
more expansive in its ambitions than transparency, promising three types of benefits: 
the disclosure of information would improve markets by leading to more informed 
decisions (Sunstein 2011); datasets would be created for empirical work on how to 
improve policy; and, open government would encourage the crowd sourcing and 
aggregation of insights and innovations across government. It is with this horizon 
that in April 2009 the OMB launched data.gov, a centralized repository for all gov-
ernment data, and whitehouse.gov/open, a website designed to enable the meeting 
8 In addition to the Hayekian idea of markets as the ideal aggregators of dispersed knowledge, this also 
drew on another epistemic argument: that certain forms of democracy are epistemically superior to other 
forms of social decision making. This epistemic argument for democracy holds that certain ways of elic-
iting opinions from everyone are more likely to get at the truth than the deliberations of one person or a 
small group of people (Landemore 2012, 2014; Estlund 2009).
9 The motto of transparency was one that Obama had adopted much earlier. In his brief time as Senator, 
Obama collaborated with “one of the most conservative Republicans” Tom Coburn, future presidential 
opponent John McCain, and fellow Democrat Tom Carper on one of his “proudest accomplishments”: 
the 2006 Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, which set up an internet database of 
government spending—“USAspending” (Lehrer et  al. 2008; Sunstein 2008). In the memorandum on 
‘Transparency and Open Government’ Obama declared that his government would seek to: “[E]stablish 
a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration… [to] promote efficiency and effective-
ness in Government… [By] disclos[ing] information rapidly in forms that the public can readily find… 
[and by directing departments to] use innovative tools, methods, and systems to cooperate among them-
selves, across all levels of Government, and with non-profit organizations, businesses, and individuals in 
the private sector” (Obama 2009b). As we argue, the current initiatives aim at more than accountability, 
hinted by the second part of the quote.
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of “government employees with the knowledge and know-how of the American peo-
ple” (Office of the Press Secretary 2009).10 As part of the open government program 
departments were directed to improve and increase the collection of information, 
publish it online, and institutionalize cultures of collaborative government (Orszag 
2009a). OIRA took a leading role in directing the roll out of the various parts of 
this initiative and created its own online resource where the public might follow the 
regulatory reviews undertaken by its staff, reginfo.gov.11,12
The epistemic aspirations of the open government initiative became more explicit 
when it was reframed as a big data project.13 The released government informa-
tion would from thereon (March 2012) be in a machine-readable format, a GitHub 
repository of resources and tools was created to accelerate open data use, and $200 
million was committed to improve state computing and data analysis infrastructure. 
It was now also hoped that digital data analysis would reveal government success 
and failure on the cheap (Krueger 2012). The expectation was that data could be 
analyzed through emerging pattern finding algorithms to unearth useful ‘insights,’ 
or that it could be used to simulate randomized control trials. Data was released in 
formats easy to harvest, alongside open-source tools, so that those with knowledge 
of information extraction and processing might study the data and pass insights back 
to the government.14 Through hackathons on challenge.gov, for example, the gov-
ernment sought to “engage citizens in solving difficult problems” by reimagining 
those problems as data analysis competitions (Open Government Partnership 2013). 
Teams of analysts were invited to download datasets and search for patterns within 
them in order to come up with solutions to the pre-specified problems.15 The initia-
tives were welcomed by data analytics firms. Google’s chief economist, Hal Varian 
(2010), commented that such large-scale data analysis would provide an alternative 
11 Despite being issued before Sunstein’s nomination was confirmed, the open government project bore a 
significant imprint of the ideas presented in Infotopia.
12 For archived links to all the websites discussed in this paragraph, see (accessed December 2016):
 https ://web.archi ve.org/web/20161 23018 4053/https ://www.data.gov/
 https ://web.archi ve.org/web/20161 22919 3151/https ://www.chall enge.gov/list/
 https ://web.archi ve.org/web/20161 23108 1206/https ://www.regul ation s.gov/
 https ://web.archi ve.org/web/20161 23100 3758/white house .gov/open
 https ://web.archi ve.org/web/20161 22920 1415/https ://www.regin fo.gov/publi c/.
13 See Office of Science and Technology Policy (2012) for an archived version of the big data initiative 
announcement.
14 See, for example, the “green button” and “blue button” initiatives, accessed at:
 https ://www.white house .gov/blog/2012/03/22/green -butto n-givin g-milli ons-ameri cans-bette r-handl 
e-energ y-costs , on February 19, 2017. Or, more recently, “The White House Open Data Innovation Sum-
mit and Solutions Showcase”, accessed at:
 https ://www.data.gov/event /white -house -open-data-innov ation -summi t/, on February 19, 2017.
15 A recent example was the “Opioid Code-a-Thon” of November last year, in which “Participants will 
use a variety of provided datasets related to opioids and develop a solution to address one of the fol-
lowing challenge tracks: Opioid Treatment, Opioid Usage, Opioid Misuse Prevention.” https ://www.chall 
enge.gov/chall enge/hhs-opioi d-code-a-thon/, accessed 20 May 2020.
10 The website regulations.gov was created during the Bush Presidency as part of its eRulemaking pro-
gram. The motivation was not “open government” but rather replacement of an expensive paper-based 
system by a fully electronic one (OIRA 2008: 38).
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to paying for the services of expertise. The open invitation for citizen engagement 
therefore in practice narrowed into appeals for data scientists and firms to study the 
records of the US government. To understand why collaborative knowledge mak-
ing took this form we need to look at the second key dimension of this emerging 
epistemology.
Critique of Judgment
In addition to the vision of dispersed knowledge, Sunstein and other members of 
Obama’s two administrations, like OMB director Peter Orszag, subscribed to the 
critique of individual cognition emerging from behavioral economics.16 The semi-
nal contributions that anchor behavioral economics came from two Israeli experi-
mental psychologists, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, collaborating in the 
study of cognition and subjective probability. By the early 1970s they had identified 
a set of routines, or heuristics, that aided but also warped individuals’ understand-
ing of information.17 Although not usually acknowledged, Tversky and Kahneman 
were moved by a suspicion of, what we today might call experiential expertise, the 
authority of the judgments of medical doctors, professors of statistics, and other 
formidable experts (Lewis 2016). Tversky and Kahneman never committed to a 
mechanism explaining the shortcomings of cognition, but in recent years their fol-
lowers, and Kahneman himself (2012), have endorsed a dual model of the brain. In 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde fashion, a “system one” that is impulsive and emotional is 
believed to inhabit the limbic regions of the brain. By contrast, a system “two” for 
more demanding calculus and reasoning is associated with the posterior (prefrontal) 
areas of the cortex (Sunstein 2013a: 204). Behavioral economics warns of an immi-
nent threat of unreason that is wired to the human neural architecture. The norma-
tive program of behavioral economics is to set straight individual choice, either by 
strengthening system two, or by correcting the wrongs perpetuated by system one 
such as a lack of self-control, short-termism and various biases in judgment (the 
byproducts of the mentioned heuristics).
Sunstein and his longtime collaborator, the 2017 winner of the Economics Nobel 
memorial prize, Richard Thaler, have argued that regulators must take advantage 
16 Despite an early career enthusiasm, Sunstein was unconvinced by the rational agent-based models of 
human agency that dominated the classic Law and Economics school. He instead favored empirically 
informed behavioral models drawn from psychology, calling such models “the most exciting intellectual 
development[s] of my lifetime” (Wallace-Wells 2010). With his co-authors he outlined this behavioral 
approach to economics and the law in a number of papers and in the popular book Nudge (Sunstein et al. 
1998; Sunstein and Thaler 2003a, b, 2008; Sunstein 2011). Orzsag was similarly impressed stating that 
behavioral economics is "one of the most important intellectual developments of the past several years” 
(Orszag 2009d).
17 The principal heuristics were representation, availability, and anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974). Repurposing some of their earlier work, Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1981, 1986) outlined a 
“prospect theory” that accounted for the incoherence and inconsistency of behavior (or more technically 
the violation of principles of dominance and invariance). The relabeling, however, did not fundamentally 
change the character of their research.
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of “the emerging science of choice.” They believe that individuals can be steered 
towards rational outcomes, by which they mean the choices individuals would have 
made if they had self-control, were fully informed, and had the time and cognitive 
resources to calculate the best course of action. Through default rules and other 
“nudges,” governments and the private sector should “make it automatic” and thus 
“ensure that if people do nothing at all, things will go well for them” (Sunstein 
2006: 100).18 A key 2010 memo by Sunstein on ‘Disclosure and Simplification as 
Regulatory Tools,’ suggested multiple ways information could be structured to get 
the right messages across, and how the disclosure of information could constitute 
nudges. The memo distinguished between “making a merely technical disclosure—
that is, making information available somewhere and in some form, regardless of 
its usefulness—and actually informing choices” (Sunstein 2010b). The dull work of 
disclosure could become a “low-cost, high-impact regulatory tool” (Sunstein 2010c, 
d) provided it is “preceded by a careful analysis of their likely effects” (Sunstein 
2010b).
Enthusiasm for behavioral science continued even after Sunstein and Orszag left 
government, and in fact seems to have blossomed after their departure. In the final 
years of the Presidency, Obama issued an executive order “Using Behavioral Sci-
ence Insights to Better Serve the American People” (#13707, September 15, 2015), 
that encouraged agencies to draw on “research findings from fields such as behavio-
ral economics and psychology about how people make decisions and act on them.” 
(Obama 2015) The executive order created a Social and Behavioral Sciences Team 
(SBST) within the West Wing to advise on behavioral approaches to communication 
and choice architecture. The team was part of the Office of Science and Technology 
but openly collaborated with OIRA.
One of Kahneman and Tversky’s powerful insights (although not exclusive to 
their approach) was that they could manipulate individuals’ decisions by tweaking 
the presentation of the problem. They never contended that they could transform 
the human subject, who was always deemed immutable and a black box. The work 
of psychology was focused on the choice not on the chooser. Kahneman’s research 
in vision (for a later instance, see Kahneman and Henik (1981)) reveals an interest 
for gestalt psychology (Heukelom 2014: 107–111). Perceptual illusions were a fre-
quent metaphor in presentations of ‘prospect theory’ (see in particular Kahneman 
and Tversky 1986).
The direction of actors’ attention is a crucial aspect of nudging and is evident in 
numerous behavioral inspired initiatives of the Obama Presidency. In its report to 
Congress in 2009, OIRA explained that the policy payback of behavioral economics 
was “simplifying choices through sensible default rules and reduced complexity” 
and “by increasing the salience of certain factors and variables” (OIRA 2009: 37). 
Many of the interventions inspired by behavioral economics are visually labored 
18 In the book revisiting his years in government, Sunstein (2013a: 35) also adds that “we need choice 
architecture for choice architects,” cognitive regulation of the regulators, and that “cost-benefit analysis is 
a nudge” to make the government use system 2, the rational decision-maker. The choice architecture that 
presses the government to rational calculation is the OMB and OIRA.
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to seize attention and direct action. The team of young postgraduates that made up 
SBST claimed early success in improving outcomes with Service members’ savings, 
low-income students’ enrolment in colleges and loans, and enrolments in health 
insurance (SBST 2015). The interventions comprised of phrasing and visual presen-
tations of emails, orientation briefings, notices, reminders, and personalized letters. 
The government’s reach over disclosure and information requirements and its signif-
icant communicative power offered it an opportunity to redesign choice situations.
The part played by behavioral science in regulatory design is well displayed in 
the case of MyPlate. In 1992, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
introduced the Food Guide Pyramid that illustrated the elements of a healthy diet.19 
To update the underlying nutritional information, the USDA retired the Food Guide 
Pyramid in 2005 and replaced it with MyPyramid. However, the new presentation 
was seen by many as confusing and in June 2011 the USDA introduced MyPlate 
(see figures 1A–C). Each change followed a process of advanced study (OIRA 2009: 
37). The pyramid representation gave citizen gourmands a measure of the shares of 
foodstuffs by way of a hierarchy. Its legibility was potentially problematic because 
it placed the least healthy foods at its summit (Fig 1A). The later version sought to 
preserve the familiarity of the pyramid without the ranking, setting out the shares of 
each food group in a healthy diet (Fig 1B). The plate took from the pyramid the idea 
of color-coded shares but placed on a pie chart that by recalling, by name and like-
ness, a plate invites citizens to compare their meals to the icon.20 The benchmarking 
of meal and advice is made as immediate as it can be. As the First Lady explained at 
its unveiling, moms and dads are too taxed with time to be also nutritionists but “we 
do have time to take a look at our kids’ plates. As long as they’re half full of fruits 
and vegetables, and paired with lean proteins, whole grains and low-fat dairy, we’re 
golden. That’s how easy it is” (USDA Office of Communications 2011).21 
MyPlate is appealing in its parsimony and immediacy, quickening decision time, 
unburdening individuals of reading through long explanations.22 It is kind on the 
time and attention of citizens. The idealized choice environments induce individuals 
towards the right choices without need for elaborate judgment, calculation, or atten-
tion. These designs, rich in visual metaphor, nearly always abstract from and hide 
19 For a history of how nutritional advice and product labels became part of the states ‘informational 
infrastructure,’ see Frohlich (2017).
20 For a challenge to the advice contained in the simplified plate, see https ://www.hsph.harva rd.edu/nutri 
tions ource /healt hy-eatin g-plate -vs-usda-mypla te/, accessed November 24 2016.
21 In the case of fuel economy labels in cars, immediacy was achieved by setting alongside the estimate 
of average consumption per mile also a 5-year monetary estimate of savings from fuel efficiency, over the 
average vehicle. Environmental considerations were coupled with financial consideration of the value of 
the vehicle.
22 A nudge of a different kind was the default enrollment into a pension. As stated in the Federal Budget 
of 2010, "research has shown that the key to saving is to make it automatic and simple. Under this pro-
posal, employees will be automatically enrolled in workplace pension plans—and will be allowed to opt 
out if they choose. … Experts estimate that this program will dramatically increase the savings participa-
tion rate for low and middle-income workers to around 80 percent." Despite its unveiling in the budget 
proposal, and unlike the United Kingdom, the US Department of Labor has not pursued implementation 
of the initiative (OMB 2010: 37).
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away the reasoning behind the guidance. The solution is not to make a better human 
brain nor to impel individuals to act slowly and thoughtfully. The ideal is to cre-
ate environments where the right choices are nearly automatic (Schüll and Zaloom 
2011).
Liberal political theory assumes that individuals will know themselves and act in 
agreement with their circumstances and desires, as sovereign of their choices. After 
the lessons of Tversky and Kahneman it seems reckless to trust individuals’ better 
judgment. Behavioral experiments reveal that even sophisticated, educated persons 
give inconsistent accounts of their wants and preferences and engage in faulty rea-
soning. The matter is worse when individuals form choice collectives and meet to 
deliberate, because all sorts of bad interactions such as informational and reputa-
tional cascades are said to ensue and confound the best course of action (Sunstein 
and Hastie 2014). If one accepts behavioral economics’ skepticism that actors’ may 
not always command their own reasons or judge situations wisely, then mechanisms 
aiming to elicit fruitful collaboration and knowledge exchange need to protect actors 
against the appeal of bias and error or reckon those failings into the analysis. The 
open government initiative (and the subsequent big data initiative) were designed 
with this in mind. In Whitehouse.gov/open and data.gov the stress was on modes 
of participation that were atomistic and depersonalized, erased of social markers 
and opportunities for sociability. The public was believed smarter under a shroud 
of anonymity and facing the glare of a computer screen. Other elements of the open 
government initiative did away with deliberation completely. By reimagining social 
issues as data analysis competitions, the hackathons of challenge.gov, for example, 
removed any form of deliberation from the determination of policy interventions. 
The frustrating message of behavioral economics about the limits of human judg-
ment, thus validated the algorithmic rationality promised by the big data initiative. 
Obama’s big data and open government initiatives, in turn, elevated the standing of 
behavioral readings of data and evidence by building data sets on choice and empha-
sizing empiricism (both pattern matching and simulated and real randomized control 
trials).23
The social science of choice applies not only to householders but also to the gov-
ernment and its advisors. Behavioral economists distrust the wisdom of fast thinking 
experts, whose authority derives from experience (for a contrasting standpoint that 
values heuristics, see Gigerenzer 2008). Behavioral economics levels the authority 
of experienced or not, credentialed or not, because the human brain will always be 
an unreliable interpreter of choices that involve uncertainty, self-control, future out-
comes, which comes to be nearly all of social life. Behavioral economics has thus 
much to say about valid and invalid knowledge ways. Within the Obama administra-
tion this combined with the dispersed conception of knowledge outlined above  to 
support a reimagining of expertise.
23 Open government was also Sunstein’s answer to the charge of paternalism sometimes leveled against 
his behavioral polices. He argues that making government processes, decisions, and information open 
and transparent will make government more efficient and “create a strong safeguard against ill-consid-
ered or ill-motivated plans” (Sunstein and Thaler 2008: 240).
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Fig. 1  A The Food Pyramid of 1992. B The MyPyramid. C MyPlate in 2011
549
1 3
Epistemic Consultants and the Regulation of Policy Knowledge
Epistemic Consultants
We have described how in the last 40 years oversight over the flow of information 
emerged as a feature of the White House’s administrative control over the breadth of 
Fig. 1  (continued)
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the US government. The Obama administration saw in the management of informa-
tion a means to tap dispersed knowledge in the polity and to encourage the use of 
behavioral social science in policy design. We have argued that Obama’s informa-
tional reforms should be seen together as part of an emergent epistemology. The 
various open government, big data, and behavioral policy initiatives emerged in con-
cert, congratulating the public as a privileged interlocutor and promising smarter 
government. They acted on the same aspect of government (the management of 
information), they did so through the same set of institutions (the OMB, OIRA), 
and they were supported by the same set of actors. Moreover, the different initiatives 
drew support from one another and from two key epistemic assumptions: (i) that the 
kind of knowledge relevant for policy is best thought of as dispersed through soci-
ety; and, (ii) that individual judgment is unreliable. In this section we discuss how 
this emerging epistemology answered the question: who are the experts that we can 
rely upon to guide government policy?
The promotion of transparency in the open government and big data initiatives 
was in reality a project for deepening informational control. In its infancy, OIRA 
brought the regulatory agencies to account by way of cost-benefit calculations. In 
the Obama years, oversight of regulatory processes was established by translating 
actions, past, present, and future, into machine-readable data that could be coded, 
stored, monitored and analyzed digitally. Traditional procedures of consultation 
such as focus groups appeared to these open government champions as “often highly 
artificial” and “sometimes test what people like rather than what they would actu-
ally do” (Sunstein 2013a: 188). Instead, people’s behavior—what they do and how 
much they do of it, not their judgments and how they reason them—was emphasised 
as the input of analysis. Although transparency appeared as a democratic pledge, of 
the elected addressing the electors, in practice it called into being systems of stand-
ardization and evaluation that asserted the command of the White House over the 
procedures of regulatory agencies.
Experiential expertise—with detailed knowledge of particular processes, environ-
ments, and capacities accumulating through experience—was undermined by the 
idea of dispersed knowledge. In its place OIRA elevated information aggregation, 
data analysis, and randomized control trials as archetypes of evidence for policy. 
These archetypes became increasing emphasized as ways of cutting through the sup-
posedly blinkered conversations on policy issues like health and education and get-
ting at “what works” (Orszag 2009b, c). Experienced domain specific experts were 
supplanted by epistemic consultants who could aggregate and process information 
from a variety of sources in cunning ways that typically did not call upon introspec-
tion, individual testimony, or debate.
The promotion of behavioral policy followed a similar pattern. The critique of 
judgment within behavioral economics raises doubts over what experts can claim 
to know. But, while behavioral economics is critical of expert judgment it does not 
call for a removal of scholars from public service. As with information collation 
procedures, the design of choice architecture calls for skills that are not bound to 
any domain of policy or human action. The recruitment of domain specific experts 
with on the ground knowledge, who might tailor interventions to social context, 
was replaced by data analysis and policy experimentation from experts attuned to 
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the faults of human cognition and by interventions that circumvented judgment and 
streamlined decision.
Like those called on to aggregate information and look for insights in government 
data, the Obama wiz kids at the SBST had no subject specific competency (such 
as education, defense, or welfare). They brought to government a general compe-
tency in evaluating evidence on the effectiveness of alternative regulations and a 
new approach to the design of interventions. Rather than deferring to those with 
knowledge of particular domains (inside or outside government) or convening stake-
holders in focus groups to identify what disclosure regime would work best in food 
labeling, or in credit card statements, the regulator should seek the guidance of rand-
omized control trials and behavioral experiments (Orszag 2009b, c).24
The information reforms of the Obama administration drew no grand reordering 
of the functions of government, for expansion or for contraction, yet epistemic con-
sultants were placed to make contributions to every branch of the regulatory state. 
They were privileged guides through the vast landscape of government and behavio-
ral data setting out opportunities for policy intervention and closing off futile regula-
tion. But because they conceive society as a system of designed choice situations, 
private and public, intended or not, they have also become crucial participants in 
the design (and testing) of new rules.25 They are consultants not only in the immedi-
ate sense of being hired experts advising government, they are also consultants to 
the citizenry designing labels, information campaigns, disclosure requirements, and 
government communications that guide individuals to better outcomes.
Conclusion
We have argued that key reforms of the Obama administration spelled out a new 
vision for the use of knowledge in policy, based on a coupling of the idea of dis-
persed knowledge with behavioral economics’ critique of judgment. In practice this 
new vision amounted to a new set of “knowledge ways” for the US government that 
shifted the “preferred modes of producing public knowledge and conducting policy 
24 One example that illustrates how standards of evidence empower and disempower types of expertise 
can be found in the March 2010 OIRA decision to return the Department of Transport’s ruling on effi-
ciency rating requirements for replacement tires. The Department had been focused on the tests that tires 
should be subject to, i.e. on the physics of tire safety and on processes of test certification. OIRA’s focus 
was on the labeling, encouraging “clarity” of the most relevant information and “intelligibility” in use 
of scales. OIRA asked the Department to test and measure consumer understanding. The key to OIRA 
was not to improve tire testing but to optimize the interaction between sellers and consumers enhancing 
behavioral outcomes. OIRA justified its intervention on the rule making of the Department of Transport 
as simplifying the interaction between sellers and consumers (Sunstein 2010e). In this case and others, 
Obama-era OIRA set itself as a crucial knowledge broker pushing rule makers to be mindful of the cog-
nitive capacities of consumers.
25 OIRA explained in its report to Congress that “disclosure requirements should be tested in advance, 
preferably through quasi-experimental studies, and not merely through focus group testing, which can be 
unreliable as a guide to actual behavior” (OIRA 2010: 40). The retiring head of the Council of Economic 
Advisers supported these ideas describing these tests as “pilot projects and randomized experiments” to 
identify useful interventions (quoted in OIRA (2011: 60) and again in OIRA (2012: 76)).
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deliberation” in favor of information aggregation, data analysis, behavioral experi-
ments, and randomized control trials.
The coupling of dispersed knowledge and a critique of judgment was neither 
spontaneous nor inevitable. From the standpoint of the history of ideas and the soci-
ology of knowledge, the two strands have developed in academic and public spheres 
with no noticeable convergence. Although our goal in this paper was to describe 
an emerging epistemology, not to offer a definitive account of why it came into 
being, political and institutional circumstances might provide a plausible causal 
story for the coupling of dispersed knowledge and behavioral economics. Such a 
story could stress how an obstructionist Congress encouraged Obama officials 
to do policy by executive order and to deploy tools of administrative control over 
the independent agencies. Obama officials explicitly understood information engi-
neering as a means to audit and command regulatory policy. The encouragement 
towards an administrative presidency was pursued in an institutional infrastructure 
that recommended the epistemic emphasis. As we discussed, throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s previous administrations had placed the OMB and OIRA as overseers of 
regulation. Rather than yield their power through the distribution of funds or other 
heavy-handed politics, the Obama administration sought to control through the soft 
power of redesigning the flow of information and centralizing the assessment of evi-
dence. OIRA established its authority over the domain specific agencies (and their 
in-house or consulting experts) as an epistemic broker with outspoken preferences 
and guidelines.
Our story and its configuration of actors, interests, and preferences is not a full 
account of the Obama record, nor do we claim this to be the most salient feature of 
that record. Moral suasion was as important for Obama’s leadership as was bureau-
cratic innovation. Obama made use of his charisma and popularity to work social 
change by mass persuasion and moral example.26 At the same time, any account 
of the Obama presidency should not ignore that alongside his compellingly per-
sonal, affective leadership, was an austerely empiricist approach to regulatory 
policymaking.
The new information management initiatives were at their launch portrayed as 
aiming to enhance transparency and trust in government. While the American reg-
ulatory state pillared on open data and experimental social science may be more 
accessible, as a database of reports and spreadsheets, to anyone with a computer and 
an internet connection, it was not made more assessable. Policy decisions remained 
as opaque from the citizenry as they were before since without key new skills—in 
data analysis, experimental social science, and behavioral economics—the wealth 
of data, its meaning, and insights lay inert and incommensurable. With the motto 
of dispersed knowledge, OIRA and the OMB issued a call for citizen engagement. 
While the idea of dispersed knowledge deflated the authority of experiential experts, 
26 For example, Obama urged states to pass $10 per hour minimum wages floors in 2013 (18 plus D.C. 
did so), see: https ://www.white house .gov/raise -the-wage; and his comments on Supreme Court ruling on 
same sex marriage: https ://www.white house .gov/the-press -offic e/2015/06/26/remar ks-presi dent-supre 
me-court -decis ion-marri age-equal ity, both accessed on November 24, 2016.
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that authority was not passed to citizens at large. Instead, those that benefitted most 
were individuals and organizations that knew how to aggregate and manipulate data 
from multiple sources and parse that data through the grid of new ideas about cog-
nition and choice architecture. These symbol manipulators emerged as epistemic 
consultants, aids to new policy evaluation and design, and a new kind of policy 
oversight.
One feature of the ongoing debate about the status of expertise in liberal democ-
racies is to see the election of Donald Trump in the USA and the Brexit vote in the 
UK as a watershed moment for a shift in attitudes towards expert guidance. Some, 
mainly in the media, have called our times a “post-truth era” where sentiment is 
more powerful than argument, and facts are routinely muddled by conspiracy theo-
ries and hyperbole. Science studies has vigorously responded to these developments. 
Some eminent scholars have suggested that analysis from the discipline may have 
aided public skepticism and confusion about whom to trust as expert. The claim (see 
Collins et al. 2017; Fuller 2016; Lynch 2017; and Sismondo 2017a, b for different 
takes on this argument) is that by endorsing “symmetry” between beliefs (true and 
not true, credentialed and uncredentialled) the sociology of knowledge has leveled 
the epistemic playing field and has legitimated a version of epistemic democracy 
that empowers populists, bigots, and charlatans. To mend the damage done some 
authors have set out an agenda of drawing “our scientific understanding of science 
and expertise” to adjudicate between institutional arrangements and robust grounds 
of expertise (Collins et al. 2017).
Our study shows that another project of adjudicating expertise preceded alarm 
over a “post-truth era” and that it was successful in shaping key reforms in the gov-
ernment of the USA. These competitors to science studies grounded their claims 
not on ethnographies of knowledge making and on the study of the form of life of 
science, rather they launched their program with a foot in cognitive science and 
another in data science. Given the policy achievements outlined in this paper, the 
key phrases in any causal story that connects intellectuals to distrust in experts are 
more likely be dispersed knowledge or cognitive bias than “symmetry.” Our study 
shows that dispersed knowledge and behavioral inspired public policy broadcasted 
a deeply skeptical view of experts, many times seeking to denounce their hubris and 
arrogance, and that it complimented the public as knowledgeable in a very diffuse 
sense, particularly when interacting in online and social media.
Binaries between the power of the elites of science and the inclusion of the lay, 
technocracy or democracy, are confounded in the actual politics of the initiatives 
we describe. Public engagement through open government has given no voice to 
the lay, or entrusted it with epistemic authority and autonomy. Through skepticism 
about human judgment the epistemic consultants became the indispensable aggrega-
tors and processors of the “dispersed knowledge of the American public” (Sunstein 
2010d).27 Behavioral governance is by design both inclusive and technocratic.
27 After leaving office, Sunstein stated that “It would not be excessive to describe OIRA as, in large part, 
an information aggregator” (Sunstein 2013b: 1840).
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The model of epistemic governing we describe in this paper has since been dis-
mantled because a new occupant has moved into the White House. In the view of 
most commentators, President Donald Trump’s approach to regulatory policy is to 
dismantle it. This existential threat is expressed by his choices of nominations to 
the Supreme Court, and nominations to heads of agencies. Nonetheless, we believe 
that the developments of the Obama administration should not be seen as relics of 
the pre-post-truth era. The legacy of that time has not been erased. In important 
ways what is often referred to as the “distrust of experts” is a legacy of that time. 
Although Sunstein and Obama’s other information reformers are often described as 
technocrats, their version of technocracy, relying on information aggregation and 
behavioral experiments, enabled a move against more experiential forms of exper-
tise. The model of governing through information and epistemic oversight trialed in 
the Obama years, thus, deserves scholarly scrutiny as an important precursor to the 
present moment and as case of public reason in the making.28
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